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Estimating macro relations always involves aggregation over individual decision mak-
ing units.  In most cases, data on the individual level cannot be obtained and it cannot be
tested empirically if the necessary conditions for aggregation hold.  Sometimes, however, data
are available for different levels of aggregation.  So it is interesting to ask which relation exists
between the equations on the lower aggregation level and the aggregate equation.
This issue is of particular relevance in the case of European money demand.  Recently,
money demand functions for a group of European countries have been estimated and generally
have been found to perform better than most national money demand functions.
1  The choice
between an aggregate and a multi-country approach to money demand depends on the relative
importance of the aggregation error versus the specification error.  The aggregate approach
will be preferable if the specification errors cancel out by aggregating.  On the other hand, an
aggregation bias is introduced if substantial differences exist between the individual equations.
Therefore, the validity of aggregation is generally evaluated by testing for equality of the pa-
rameter estimates among the national money demand functions.
2
Nevertheless, while parameter equality is a sufficient condition for valid aggregation in
the case of linear aggregation, in money demand estimation often log-linear specifications are
used, so that aggregation is in effect nonlinear.  Here the situation becomes more complicated
as the aggregate equation bears no mathematical relationship to the individual equations.
To look into the aggregation of money demand functions a simulation study is per-
formed.
Aggregation Bias
In general, aggregation of micro relations leads to an aggregation bias because infor-
mation is lost by imposing the same parameter values on all micro equations.  In the case of
linear aggregation, Theil (1954) has shown that the macro relation will at best perform as
good as the estimated micro relations if the micro relations are correctly specified.  So, even if
the aim is to predict the behavior of the macro dependent variable, this can be better done by
using a set of micro equations than by an aggregate equation.  An aggregation bias is absent
only in two special cases: First, if all micro relations have identical parameter values aggrega-
                                               
1 See, e.g., Kremers and Lane (1990), Artis, Bladen-Howell, and Zhang (1993), and Monticelli and Strauss-
Kahn (1991).
2 See Lane and Poloz (1992), Angeloni, Cottarelli, and Levy (1994), Cassard, Masson, and Lane (1994).3
relations are aggregated and a composite residual is defined as the difference between the
macro dependent variable and the aggregate micro predictions.  The bias is computed as the
difference between the sum of squared residuals from the aggregate relation and the sum of
squared composite residuals.  This procedure is repeated 1000 times to obtain the mean of the
bias and its standard deviation.
To check the model, first linear aggregation is considered and the aggregate variables
are defined as the sum of the micro variables.  In this case, Theil’s results are reproduced by
the model.  If the b coefficient is the same for both countries, the aggregation bias is not sig-
nificantly different from zero.  The same is true if output in one country is defined to be a fixed
shared of output in the other country so that the distribution of the independent variables re-
mains constant through time.  As the parameter a does not appear in the cointegrating regres-
sion, its value is irrelevant for the aggregation bias.
Logarithmic aggregation
Next, the case of logarithmic aggregation is investigated.  For the construction of the
aggregate variables, the antilogs of m
i and y
i are taken, the variables are added up and then
transformed into logarithms again before the macro equation is estimated.  This procedure is
also applied for the computation of the fitted values from the micro equations.
Interestingly, the Theil conditions do not translate to the case of logarithmic aggrega-
tion.  Neither the equality of parameters nor the invariance of the distribution of the independ-
ent variables over time is a sufficient condition for the absence of an aggregation error.  In-
stead, the aggregation bias depends on all parameter values of the model.  Contrary to the
linear case, where the aggregate equation can at least be as good as the micro models taken
together, with logarithmic aggregation the aggregate equation may perform even better than
the micro equations in certain parameter regions.
In the following, the simulation results are presented in detail.  First, it is assumed that
both countries are identical.  The parameter a is fixed at 0.1 and different choices for b are
investigated.
5  The mean aggregation bias and its standard deviation are shown in Fig. 1.
While logarithmic aggregation in general leads to an aggregation bias even for identical micro
equations, for an income elasticity between 1.0 and 1.5 it results in a small, but significant
gain.
                                                                                                                                                 
4 In the following, this procedure is referred to as logarithmic aggregation.
5 The parameter values are in the range generally found in money demand estimations.4
In contrast to the case of linear aggregation, the bias depends also on the variance of
the random shocks (see Fig. 2a to 2d).  With lower variance the aggregation bias approaches
zero.  This is intuitively plausible as, with identical countries, the aggregation bias results from
the error terms and thus decreases with a lower error variance.
The aggregation bias depends on the value of a, the drift parameter in income, as well
(see Fig. 3), though the results do not change much within the range of empirically plausible
values for a.  The more equations are aggregated, the more pronounced is the aggregation
gain. This result can also be found in practice, see e.g., Arnold (1994), who aggregates money
demand equations over OECD countries and finds a better performance of the aggregate
equation the more countries are included.
Next, the distribution of the independent variables is kept fixed and the effect of differ-
ent parameter values for b is investigated, so that the countries only differ in their income
elasticity.
6  For the first country b is fixed at 1, for the second country b takes values between
0.5 and 2.0.  Results are shown in Fig. 4. While in the linear case no aggregation bias results
with a fixed distribution of the independent variables, this is not true for logarithmic aggrega-
tion.  The aggregation bias increases with the values of b becoming more diverse.
The last simulation considers countries with different parameter values and without a
fixed income distribution over time.  In this case, linear aggregation would lead to a bias, too.
Again for country one b is fixed at 1, for the second country b takes values between 0.95 and
1.05. The aggregation bias in the logarithmic case increases much faster with growing diver-
sity of the parameters than in the linear case (see Fig. 5).  But in the linear as in the logarithmic
case the aggregation bias is much larger with different parameter values than the bias in the
logarithmic case with identical parameter values.
Application
Since the simulations show that equality of the parameter estimates is not sufficient for
the absence of an aggregation error, the model is applied to the estimation of a European
money demand function for M1.  Aggregation is performed over three countries, which are the
most likely candidates for a core union, i.e., Germany, France and the Netherlands.  The sam-
ple period is 1974:1 to 1994:4, data are quarterly.  Real money, deflated by the consumer
price index, is assumed to depend on an income variable and the opportunity cost of holding
                                               
6 The parameter values for a and s are kept at 0.1 and 1 for both countries.6
Neither the requirement of equal parameter values nor the condition of a time invariant distri-
bution of the independent variables is a sufficient condition for the absence of an aggregation
bias.  Nevertheless, for the parameter values generally encountered in money demand estima-
tions the bias (which even may be an aggregation gain) is fairly small so that the Theil condi-
tions can be taken as a good approximation in testing for aggregation bias.  As the bias is in-
creasing much faster with logarithmic aggregation than with linear aggregation, tests for pa-
rameter equality should perhaps use a more conservative significance levels because even small
differences in parameter values lead to a fairly high aggregation bias.  Nevertheless, results are
sensitive to parameter values and in particular applications the existence of an aggregation
error can only be checked for by simulations.7
References
Angeloni, I., Cottarelli, C., and Levy, A. (1994): Cross-Border Deposits, Aggregation, and
Money Demand in the Transition to EMU. Journal of Policy Modeling 16(1): 27-54.
Arnold, I.J.M. ( 1994): The Myth of a Stable European Money Demand. Open Economies
Review 5: 249-259.
Artis, M.J.; Bladen-Hovell, R.C., and Zhang, W. (1993): A European Money Demand
Function. In: Masson, Paul R. and Taylor, Mark P. Policy Issues in the Operation of
Currency Unions. Cambridge University Press, 240-265.
Cassard, M., Lane, T.D., and Masson, P.R. (1994): ERM Money Supplies and the Transi-
tion to EMU.  IMF Working Paper WP/94/1.
Falk, M. and Funke, N. (1995): The Stability of Money Demand in Germany and the EMS:
Impact of German Unification. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131(3): 470-488.
Kremers, J.J.M. and Lane, T.D. (1990): Economic and Monetary Integration and the Ag-
greate Demand for Money in the EMS. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers
37(4): 777-805.
Lane, T.D. and Poloz, S.S. (1992): Currency Substitution and Cross-Border Monetary Ag-
gregation: Evidence from the G-7. IMF Working Paper WP/92/81.
Lee, K.C.; Pesaran, M.H., and Pierse, R.G. (1990): Testing for Aggregation Bias in Linear
Models. The Economic Journal 100: 137-150.
Lovell, C.A.K. (1973): A Note on Aggregation Bias and Loss. Journal of Econometrics 1:
301-311.
MacKinnon, J.G. (1991): Critical Values for Cointegration Tests. In: Engle, Robert F. and
Granger, Clive W. J. Long-Run Economic Relationships: Oxford University Press:
267-276.
Monticelli, C. and Strauss-Kahn, M.-O. (1991) European Integration and the Demand for
Broad Money. Banque de France, Notes d'études et de recherche 16.8
OECD (1990): Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures - GK Results. Paris: Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Pesaran, M. H., Pierse, R.G., and Kumar, M.S. (1989): Econometric Analysis of Aggrega-
tion in the Context of Linear Prediction Models. Econometrica 57(4): 861-888.
Theil, H. (1954): Linear Aggregation of Economic Relations. North Holland.Fig. 1
9












- 2 SEFig. 2
10










0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
ß








0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
ß








0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
ß








0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
ßFig. 3
11













0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
ß
a = 0
a = 0.5Fig. 4
12
Aggregation bias with different values for ß and
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